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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The above-entitled Appeal is from a judgment granted by the
Second Judicial District Court, Weber County, State of Utah, in
favor of Plaintiff/Appellee.

The court has jurisdiction to hear

this matter pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(k).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in refusing to allow documentary

and any other evidence concerning the Trust Deed and Deed in Lieu
of Foreclosure?

This issue was determined as a matter of law by

the trial court and is reviewed by this Court for correctness.
Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Hardy. 834 P.2d 554, 555 (Utah 1992).
2.

Did the trial court err in refusing to allow testimony

concerning the Trust Deed Note?

This issue was determined as a

matter of law by the trial court and is reviewed by this Court for
correctness.

Citicorp Mortgage. Inc. v. Hardy. 834 P.2d 554, 555

(Utah 1992) .
3.

Did the trial court err in finding the Trust Deed to not

be credible documentation of a valid encumbrance?

The standard of

review for this issue is a review of the appropriateness of the
exercise of the trial court's discretion.
552 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Utah 1976);

Bambrough v. Bethers,

Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical.

Inc. . 764 P.2d 636, 639 (Ct. App. Utah 1988).

The standard for

reviewing whether the trial court has properly exercised its
discretion is the following:
1

[W]here the lower tribunal, acting within the scope of
its authority, has conducted a hearing and arrived at a
decision, the reviewing court will examine only the
certified record; and will not interfere with matters of
discretion or upset the action of the lower tribunal
except upon a showing that the tribunal acted in excess
of its authority or in a manner so clearly outside reason
that its action must be deemed capricious and arbitrary.
Peatross v. Bd. of Commas of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281, 284
(Utah 1976) (citations omitted).
4.

Did the trial court err in finding that the transaction

involving the Trust Deed and Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure violated
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act?

The standard of review for

this issue is a review of the appropriateness of the exercise of
the trial court's discretion. Bambrouah v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286,
1290 (Utah 1976);

Reeves v. Geiay Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d

636, 639 (Ct. App. Utah 1988).

The standard for reviewing whether

the trial court has properly exercised its discretion is the
following:
[W]here the lower tribunal, acting within the scope of
its authority, has conducted a hearing and arrived at a
decision, the reviewing court will examine only the
certified record; and will not interfere with matters of
discretion or upset the action of the lower tribunal
except upon a showing that the tribunal acted in excess
of its authority or in a manner so clearly outside reason
that its action must be deemed capricious and arbitrary.
Peatross v. Bd. of Commas of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281, 284
(Utah 1976) (citations omitted).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
U.C.A. 25-6-1, et. seq.

See Addendum.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case,

This is an action brought by Plaintiff/Appellee Susan White
"White") seeking to have a certain Trust Deed executed by Western
Railroad Builders Defined Benefit Pension Plan ("Plan"), in favor
Defendant/Appellant Wyoming and Colorado Railroad Company, Inc.
("WYCO"), dated December 20, 1988.
II.

Course of Proceeding Below.

On May 7, 1991, White filed her Complaint in this action
which, pursuant to court order, was amended on August 1, 1991 (R.
at 1, 86). On August 27, 1991, WYCO answered the Complaint (R. at
97) .

During the pendency of this action, both parties filed

Motions for Summary Judgment, which were both denied (R. at 152,
264, 368).

On June 14, 1993, White filed a Motion in Limine,

seeking an order from the court prohibiting WYCO from submitting
into evidence any documentation concerning the source of funds
which were paid to White pursuant to court order in a separate
action (R. at 371).

WYCO filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the

Motion in Limine (R. at 381), and the Court granted White's Motion
in Limine on August 24, 1993 (R. at 390). The trial was held on
October 29, 1993.
III. Disposition in the Court Below.
At the conclusion of the trial of this matter, the trial court
took the matter under advisement and subsequently issued its
Memorandum Decision on December 29, 1993 (R. at 480).
3

Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment were entered on January
21, 1994 (R. at 486, 495) , which Judgment set aside the Trust Deed
and declared the subject property to still be under the ownership
of the Plan.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

In January of 1985, the Plan entered into an Ernest Money

Agreement for the purchase of certain real property located in
Eden, Utah, from White (Transcript at 34; Exhibit 3).
2.

In a separate action, the Honorable Judge David E. Roth

found that both parties had breached the contract and that the
contract would be reinstated upon payment by the Plan of $35,972.91
and conveyance by White to the Plan of 2.68 acres of the property.
(Transcript at 38; Exhibit 3).
3.

Judge Roth also found that a mutual mistake had been

made, and that neither party realized that approximately 10 acres
of the

land had been released at the time the real estate

transaction closed.
4.

(Transcript at 39; Exhibit 3).

In order to make the requirement payment of $35,972.91,

and to pay attorney's fees, the Plan borrowed $45,972.91 from WYCO.
(Transcript at 39, 49, 64, 71, 76, 82, 121, 125, 222).
5.

On December 20, 1988, as security for this obligation,

the Plan executed a Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed in favor of WYCO
encumbering the 12.68 acres which the Plan was to own free and
clear pursuant to the court order.
121, 125, 142, 222, 223).
4

(Transcript at 64, 71, 76, 82,

6.

Upon the court order in the separate action that the Plan

pay $35,972.91 to Plaintiff, the Plan had no choice but to encumber
the subject property in order to obtain the necessary funds to
comply with the Court Order.
7.

(Transcript at 41).

There is no dispute that Plaintiff received $35,972.91

from the Plan (Transcript at 39, 49) and that the Plan received
$35,972.91, together with an additional $10,000.00 for legal fees,
from WYCO in exchange for executing the subject Trust Deed in the
amount of $45,972.91.

(Transcript at 64, 71, 76, 82, 121, 125,

222) .
8.

The Trust Deed was not recorded sooner because it lacked

the complete legal description initially and then languished in the
attorney7s office for a year and a half before recording, in spite
of instructions from Mr. Scott to properly handle the paperwork.
(Transcript at 74).
9.

The Plan received $35,972.91, which was paid Plaintiff,

and which, when combined with the $10,000.00 paid on the Plan's
legal fees (Transcript at 161), is identical to the obligation
secured by the Trust Deed executed on December 20, 1988.
10.

At the time the Trust Deed was executed, the Plan had

been ordered not to dispose of the subject property.
11.

(Addendum).

When the legal description of the additional 2.68 acres

had been created, making a total of 12.68 acres, the total acreage
which the Plan owned free and clear and which had been ordered

5

conveyed to the Plan by the court was added to the Trust Deed as
Exhibit A.
12.

(Transcript at 31) .

At the time of execution of the Trust Deed, the Plan had

$100,000.00 in equity on the balance of the property which was
subject to White's lien.
13.

(Transcript at 283).

The subject property was purchased for $6,000 per acre,

which at 12.68 acres would have also had some equity over and above
the $45,972.91 Trust Deed in favor of WYCO.
14.

(Transcript at 282).

Upon the Plan's default in the payment of its obligation

to WYCO, the Plan executed a Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure in favor
of WYCO on May 18, 1990.
15.

(Transcript at 45).

The trial court ruled that the Trust Deed Note was

inadmissible for failure to disclose it to opposing counsel prior
to the trial.
16.

(Transcript at 231, 258).

The Trust Deed Note was given to opposing counsel at the

deposition of David L. Durbano.

(Transcript at 195, 207, 225-26).

17. What opposing counsel had sought and claimed had not been
disclosed was "pertaining to the monies, if any, from Wyoming
Railroad and a check where it might have gone, and how the money
ultimately got to Susan White."
18.

(Transcript at 227).

No financial records from Durbano Mare Island account,

nor any other evidence of how the money got to White, was produced
nor could it be used at trial.
19.

(Transcript at 195-96).

Circumstantial evidence was presented at trial that the

Trust Deed Note was provided to counsel, based upon a practice in
6

the law office of placing documents which have been provided to
opposing counsel in one certain location of the litigation file.
(Transcript at 177, 193).
20.

White has admitted the existence of the Trust Deed Note.

(R. at 86, 110, 381).
21. White was not awarded a deficiency judgment in the other
action until June 27, 1991.

(Transcript at 44).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to

allow the Trust Deed Note into evidence.

At the trial of this

matter, the evidence proved that the Trust Deed Note had indeed
been disclosed to the other side. Although Judge Roth had ordered
early in this case that certain documents could not be used at
trial because they had not been disclosed, the Trust Deed Note was
not one of those documents.

In addition, White has admitted the

existence of the Trust Deed Note in multiple pleadings filed in
this action.
II.

The lower court in this action also refused to allow

testimony concerning the obligation underlying the Trust Deed.
This ruling was also an abuse of discretion, which was based upon
the Parol Evidence Rule, the Statute of Frauds, and the Best
Evidence Rule.

Pursuant to the Parol Evidence Rule, the trial

court should have reviewed the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed
together as the entire agreement between the parties. By refusing
to admit the Trust Deed Note into evidence, the trial court created
7

ambiguities

which

should

have

testimony.

The Trust Deed

been

explained

through

oral

itself, which was admitted

into

evidence, satisfied the Statute of Frauds concerning an interest in
real property.

In addition, due to the nexus between the Trust

Deed and Trust Deed Note, the court should have considered them
together.

Finally, the Best Evidence Rule did not preclude

testimony concerning the Trust Deed Note, since the document itself
was deemed to not exist for purposes of the trial and since the
underlying obligation has an existence independent of any writing.
III. The Trust Deed is credible documentation of a valid
encumbrance.

The court ruled otherwise based upon when it was

executed, when a part of its legal description was created, and
when it was recorded.

No evidence was submitted at trial that

supported a finding or an inference that the document was not
signed when it was purported to be.

The addition of the legal

description for the 2.68 acres, which description had not been
created at the time of execution of the Trust Deed, was not a
falsification but only a correction of the Trust Deed.

In

addition, the fact that the document was not recorded until some
time after it was executed does not make it invalid. Neither does
the purported Order of Judge Roth in a different action, which was
dismissed shortly afterwards.
IV.
the

The transaction underlying the Trust Deed did not violate

Uniform

Fraudulent

Transfer

Act.

The

Plan

received

a

reasonably equivalent value for its execution of the Trust Deed
8

Note and Trust Deed. The only badge of fraud found in U.C.A. §256-1(2) which remotely applies is that the Plan had previously been
sued by White,

Thus, no actual intent to defraud a creditor was

established at trial.

Section 25-6-6 of the Uniform Fraudulent

Transfer Act is equally inapplicable.
ARGUMENT
i.

The Trial Court Erred in Not Allowing the Trust Deed Note
Into Evidence.
At the trial of this matter, the Honorable Judge West refused
to allow into evidence the Trust Deed Note underlying the Trust
Deed, even though the Trust Deed itself was admitted into evidence.
Judge West also refused to allow any testimony concerning the
obligation evidenced by the Trust Deed Note, but this issue will be
addressed later in the Brief.

Judge West's refusal to allow the

Trust Deed Note into evidence was an abuse of discretion and was
improper for all of the reasons discussed below.
A. The Evidence at Trial Proved that the Trust Deed Note was
Disclosed.
The

trial

court

ruled

that

the

Trust

Deed

Note

was

inadmissible for failure to disclose it to opposing counsel prior
to the trial.

(Transcript at 231, 258.)

However, the weight of

the testimony at trial on this issue was contrary to the finding of
the trial court.

Douglas Durbano testified that the Trust Deed

Note was given to opposing counsel at the deposition of David
Durbano.

(Transcript at 195, 207). David Durbano also testified
9

that the Trust Deed Note was delivered to opposing counsel at his
deposition, although arguably biased testimony.
225-26).

(Transcript at

Opposing counsel attempted at trial to impeach David

Durbano's testimony concerning the Trust Deed Note by reading from
his deposition. However, such deposition testimony only clarified
that what opposing counsel had sought and claimed had not been
disclosed was "pertaining to the monies, if any, from Wyoming
Railroad and a check where it might have gone, and how the money
ultimately got to Susan White."

(Transcript at 227).

Douglas

Durbano testified concerning the fact that no financial records
from Durbano Mare Island account, nor any other evidence of how the
money got to Mrs. White, was produced nor could it be used at
trial.

(Transcript at 195-96).

However, the evidence at trial

that the Trust Deed Note was disclosed far outweighed any evidence
to the contrary.
Douglas

Durbano also testified

concerning

circumstantial

evidence that the Trust Deed Note was provided to counsel, based
upon a practice in his office of placing documents which have been
provided to opposing counsel in one certain location of the
litigation file.

(Transcript at 193.)

The Trust Deed Note was

found in that location, which is strong circumstantial evidence
that the Note was disclosed. Mr. Merrill also attempted to testify
to the same circumstantial evidence but was not allowed to by the
Court.

(Transcript at 177.) The Court was only willing to accept
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direct testimony concerning disclosure, which was an abuse of
discretion.
Opposing counsel stated incessantly on the record that he
never received the Trust Deed Note which, although not sworn
testimony, was apparently accepted by the trial court as such.
This was an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court and
formed an improper basis for the lower court's finding that the
Trust Deed Note had not been disclosed.
Phil Scott testified at trial that he did not recall seeing
the Trust Deed Note at the time of the deposition of David Durbano.
(Transcript at 709). However, Mr. Scott also testified that his
recollection would have been clearer at the time of his deposition.
(Transcript at 74). In his deposition, Mr. Scott testified that
there was a Promissory Note concerning the obligation of the Plan
to WYCO.

(Transcript at 142). Mr. Scott's better recollection at

the time of his deposition, coupled with his obvious bias from
being terminated shortly before the trial, should have made his
deposition testimony more credible. However, Judge West ruled to
the opposite and believed Mr. Scott's trial testimony, as well as
Mrs. White's testimony, which was also biased.

(Transcript at 70) .

Douglas Durbano's and Mr. Merrill's unbiased testimony was totally
ignored by the trial court.
The Utah Supreme Court has long held that the interests of
justice require that courts look at substance rather than form to
get at the merits of a question rather than avoiding questions upon
11

technicalities of procedure.
P.2d 1, 8 (Utah 1989).

Guardian State Bank v. Stancrle, 778

The trial court should have heeded such

guidance and rendered judgment on the merits of the legal questions
involved rather than settling such issues based upon procedural
technicalities.
In open court, Judge West stated:

"Clearly, if that Note was

in existence and everybody agreed that it was and that it existed,
we wouldn't be here today, because then your theory of the case
would be valid, Mr. Durbano."

(Transcript at 189) . Based upon the

abuse of discretion of the trial court in not allowing the Trust
Deed Note into evidence, and the statement that Judge West would
have ruled in Defendants favor if the Note had been allowed, this
Court should reverse the trial court's decision and grant judgment
in favor of Defendant.
B. The Trust Deed Note was not the Subject of Judge Roth's
Order Concerning Disclosure.
The trial court's ruling that the Trust Deed Note had not been
disclosed to opposing counsel was based in part upon an order from
Judge Roth that the documents which WYCO failed to provide at the
deposition of David Durbano did not exist and would not be allowed
at trial.

However, as Douglas Durbano testified, the court order

did not reference the Trust Deed or Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure,
which documents were allowed into evidence, and that such documents
together with the Trust Deed Note were not the subject of Judge
Roth's prior order.

(Transcript at 208.)
12

In her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Plaintiff agreed by stating:
In spite of the subpoenas, the request for
production, and the court order; to date the defendant
company and its registered agent and attorney, Douglas
Durbano, has not produced any records to demonstrate that
any monies were transferred from the defendant company to
the pension plan. Consequently, the court issued an
order that those records do not exist and cannot be used
at the time of trial.
(Record at 184).
Mr, Merrill's testimony also corroborated the fact that the
records which were not disclosed were "any and all financial
records of Western Railroad Builders Defined Benefit Pension Plan,
as well as any financial records of Defendant showing any transfer
from Defendant to Plan pursuant to the note and trust deed dated
December 22, 1988."

(Transcript at 171).

Mr. Merrill also testified that "David L. Durbano and Douglas
M. Durbano, as well as Defendant, have provided Plaintiff with all
such records that are in their possession, with the possible
exception of the evidence of payment by Defendant pursuant to the
Trust Deed."

(Transcript at 171).

Opposing counsel never

complained that the Trust Deed Note had not been disclosed, in
response to this statement. Indeed, the issue of whether the Trust
Deed Note itself had been disclosed did not arise until the morning
of trial.

For that reason, the trial court abused its discretion

in finding that the Trust Deed Note had not been disclosed and

13

ruling,

on

the

basis

of

such

finding,

that

the

Note

was

inadmissible at trial.
C.

In Prior Pleadings. White has Admitted the Existence

6

the Trust Deed Note.
Prior to the trial, Plaintiff filed a Motion in Limine, in
which Plaintiff stated:
The defendant through its attorney, Douglas Durbano,
filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for
sanctions, in which the defendant acknowledged that the
plaintiff was seeking financial records of Western
Railroad Builders defined benefit pension plan, as well
as any financial records the defendant had showing the
transfer of any monies to a pension plan for the note and
trust deed in question.
(R. at 381 (emphasis added)).

Plaintiff also referenced the Note

in the same way in the Subpoena served upon WYCO (R. at 110), and
in the Amended Complaint (R. at 86) .
Plaintiff's multiple references to the Note in these pleadings
is a clear acknowledgement of its existence.

In addition, WYCO

also referenced the Note in its Memorandum

in Opposition to

Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions and/or Contempt (Transcript at
166, 171).

In her Reply Memorandum, Plaintiff referenced WYCO's

Memorandum without objecting to the language concerning the Note
(Transcript at 168).

Based upon Plaintiff's admissions of the

existence of the Trust Deed Note, the refusal by the trial court to
allow the Note into evidence was an abuse of discretion.

14

II.
The Trial Court Erred in Not Allowing Oral Testimony
Concerning the Obligation Underlying the Trust Deed.
In the trial of this matter, Judge West found that the Trust
Deed was invalid partly because there was no evidence of a loan
which it was purported to secure.

The lack of evidence of the

underlying obligation was based in part on the Judge's ruling that
the Trust Deed Note was inadmissible and in part on his ruling that
testimony

concerning

the

underlying

obligation

was

also

inadmissible based upon the Parol Evidence Rule, the Statute of
Frauds and the Best Evidence Rule. Since none of these evidentiary
rules preclude testimony concerning the underlying obligation, the
trial court abused its discretion in precluding such testimony.
For that reason, this Court should reverse the trial court's ruling
and, based upon the evidence in the record, find the Trust Deed to
be a valid instrument.
A.
The Parol Evidence Rule Did Not Preclude Testimony
Concerning the Obligation Underlying the Trust Deed.
Judge West ruled that oral testimony was not admissible to
establish the underlying obligation of the Trust Deed, even though
the document itself was admitted into evidence.

Judge West's

ruling on this issue was based on the well known Parol Evidence
Rule concerning the use of parol evidence to modify a written
instrument.

However, a close look at the rule shows that it was

improperly applied by the trial court in this action.

15

The Parol Evidence Rule, as stated by Professor Corbin, is as
follows:
When two parties have made a contract and have expressed
it in writing to which they both have assented as the
complete and accurate integration of that contract,
evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent
understandings and negotiations will not be admitted for
the purpose of varying or contradicting the writing.
3 Corbin on Contracts § 573. From this statement of the Rule, the
following conclusions may be directly derived:

(1) the Parol

Evidence Rule comes into play only when the last expression is in
writing and is a binding contract, See J.D. Calamari & J.M.
Perillo, Contracts §3-2, p.99 (2d ed. 1979); (2) the Parol Evidence
Rule only applies to fully integrated and complete contracts, id.
at pp. 101-03; and (3) evidence which neither varies or contradicts
the writing is admissible under the Rule.

Rowley v. Marrcrest

Homeowners' Ass'n, 656 P.2d 414, 417 (Utah 1982)

("As in all parol

evidence cases, oral testimony may not be admitted to vary or
contradict the terms of a document; however, it is admissible to
clarify the meaning of ambiguous provisions.11); see also Mercury
Inv. Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 706 P.2d 523, 529 (Okl. 1985)
(parol or extrinsic evidence is generally admissible when such
evidence does not contradict any particular term of the writing).
"But where a contract is complete in itself and, as viewed in
its entirety, is unambiguous, its language is the only legitimate
evidence of what the parties intended." Mercury Inv. Co. 706 P.2d
at 529 (emphasis in original) . Thus, where the entire document is
16

not before the court, and there is a latent ambiguity in the
written

text, parol

testimony

is admissible

to

explain

the

ambiguity. Id. Moreover, introduction of parol evidence is proper
when such evidence "does not contradict the writing but merely
explains the transaction." Zeese v. Estate of Siecrel, 534 P.2d 85,
88 (Utah 1975). Finally, parol evidence may be admitted to clarify
the intentions of the parties. Bybee v. Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 466,
189 P.2d 118, 122 (1948).
Applied to the case at hand, the preceding legal principles
required the trial court to do one of two things. First, the lower
court should have reviewed the subject agreement in its entirety to
determine the parties7 intentions. Mercury Inv. Co., 706 P.2d at
529.

The entire agreement at issue involved both the Trust Deed

and the underlying Trust Deed Note, which the Trust Deed expressly
incorporated.

By not allowing the Note to be admitted into

evidence, Judge West in essence reviewed the contract in an
incomplete state and ruled on such contract without reviewing all
relevant language.
Clearly, by ignoring relevant contract language found in the
Trust Deed Note, the trial court in fact created ambiguities in the
transaction which the Note alone could remedy.

Based upon these

ambiguities, such as the interest rate and term of the loan, oral
testimony should have been admissible for explanatory purposes.
Id;

Zeese, 534 P.2d 85.

Defendant should have been allowed to

present testimony to explain these ambiguities, so long as the
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testimony did not change or contradict the Trust Deed itself.
Rowley, 656 P.2d at 417. The trial court's refusal to allow such
testimony was an abuse of discretion, which resulted in judgment
against Defendant.

This Court should either reverse the trial

court and grant judgment in favor of WYCO based upon the testimony
which is in the record, or remand this action back for a new trial.
B.
The Trial Court Misapplied the Statute of Frauds to the
Present Action.
The trial court also excluded all testimony concerning the
obligation underlying the Trust Deed based upon the application of
the Statute of Frauds. Although the Statute of Frauds does apply
to an interest in real property, Judge West misapplied the statute
in the case at bar to preclude evidence of the Trust Deed Note.
U.C.A. §25-5-1, that part of the Statute of Frauds which deals
with estates or interests in real property, states as follows:
No estate or interest in real property, other than
leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust
or power over or concerning real property or in any
manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted,
assigned, surrendered, or declared otherwise than by act
or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful
agent thereunto authorized by writing.
What Judge West failed to understand is that the Trust Deed,
which by stipulation was admitted into evidence, satisfies the
Statute

of Frauds concerning the interest

in real property.

Nowhere in the Statute of Frauds is it necessary for the underlying
obligation of the Trust Deed to be a written document.
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This is a

ruling from the trial court which is not supported by the statute
or by case law.

Thus, the trial court misapplied the Statute of

Frauds and should have allowed oral testimony concerning the
obligation underlying the Trust Deed.
In addition, this Court has previously stated that:
One or more writings, not all of which are signed by the
party to be charged, may be considered together as a
memorandum for purposes of the statute of frauds if there is
a nexus between them.
Machan Hampshire v. Western Real Estate, 779 P.2d 230, 234 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).

Based upon Machan, the trial court should have

considered the Trust Deed and the Trust Deed Note together, due to
the nexus between them and the fact that the Trust Deed Note is
referenced in the Trust Deed. Thus, application of the Statute of
Frauds supports the admission of the Trust Deed Note as opposed to
precluding it or testimony concerning it.
C.
Oral Testimony Concerning the Obligation Underlying the
Trust Deed was Admissible Based Upon The Best Evidence Rule.
Although the trial court did not reference The Best Evidence
Rule in the trial, it was argued to the Court prior to the trial,
in the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion in Limine, and for that reason
will be addressed here.

Rule 1002 of the Utah Rules of Evidence

states that:
To prove the content of a writing, . . . the
original writing . . . is required, except as otherwise
provided in these rules or by other rules adopted by the
Supreme Court of this State or by Statute.
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One such rule is Rule 1004 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which
states that:
The original is not required, and other evidence of
the contents of a writing . . . is admissible if:
(1) • . . All originals are lost or have been
destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed them in
bad faith;
In the case at bar, although the original Trust Deed Note was
never lost or destroyed, the trial court ruled that for purposes of
the trial, it did not exist.

This has the effect of the document

being lost or destroyed, through no bad faith of Defendant, and for
that reason, Rule 1004 allows for other evidence, including oral
testimony, concerning the obligation underlying the Trust Deed. In
addition, the Best Evidence Rule has no application when a party is
trying to prove a fact which has an existence independent of any
writing, such as the obligation underlying the Trust Deed.
v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640, 642 (Utah 1982).

Roods

Thus, the Best Evidence

Rule, as Rules 1001 through 1008 of the Utah Rules of Evidence are
commonly called, supports the admittance into evidence of oral
testimony concerning the contents of the Trust Deed Note, as
opposed to precluding it.

Based upon all the reasons above, this

Court should consider the evidence on the record concerning the
obligation underlying the Trust Deed and rule that the Trust Deed
was a valid document.
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III.
The Trust Deed is Credible Documentation of a Valid
Encumbrance•
In the Findings of Fact No. 9, Judge West found the Trust Deed
to not be credible documentation of a valid encumbrance.

His

finding was based upon concerns that the Trust Deed was allegedly
executed on December 20, 1998, that part of its legal description
was not created until March 6, 1989, and that it was not recorded
until May 18, 1990.

Based upon these concerns, the trial court

doubted the authenticity of the Trust Deed and therefore found it
not credible.

However, as discussed below, such concerns are

either unwarranted

from the evidence or do not result in a

challenge to the authenticity of the Trust Deed.
The trial court first questioned whether the document was
actually executed on December 20, 1988, the date it is purported to
be executed and the date of the notarization on the document.
Plaintiff

presented

no

evidence

at

trial

to

challenge

the

notarization, and rightly so, since no such evidence exists (R. at
346) .

No evidence was submitted at trial which controverted the

date on the Trust Deed as well. Mr. Scott, who certainly had good
reason to be biased, testified at trial that he simply could not
remember

when

the

Trust

Deed

was

signed,

although

in

his

deposition, he remembered it being about the time the check was
signed in December of 1988.

(Transcript at 143-44).

Dave Durbano

could also not recall the exact date that he signed the Trust Deed,
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but he did testify that he assumed he signed it on the date found
on the Trust Deed, since he signed it in Doug Durbano's office.
(Transcript at 279).
David Durbano also testified that he executed the Trust Deed
Note in December, 1988, which is the same time the Trust Deed would
have been signed.

(Transcript at 223).

Although Plaintiff's

counsel argued incessantly that the Trust Deed was executed after
the date found on it, the fact of the matter is that Plaintiff
failed to submit one shred of evidence of such alleged fact.

In

spite of the lack of such evidence, the trial court apparently
agreed with Defendant's counsel and found that the document was
"allegedly" signed on that date.

Since there is no basis in the

record for such a finding, the trial court's abuse of discretion is
clear.
The next concern on the Court's part over the Trust Deed was
the fact that part of the legal description did not exist until
March 6, 1989.

Plaintiff argued that the addition to the legal

description of the 2.68 acres, which additional description was
created after the execution of the Trust Deed, is an alteration of
the Trust Deed, making it void, citing Rasmussen v. Olsen, 583 P.2d
50 (Utah 1978).

In Rasmussen, one party to a deed obliterated a

paragraph reserving mineral rights, prior to recording the deed.
Id. at 51. The Utah Supreme Court found that the deed was forged
and therefore void.

Id. at 52-53.
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The case at bar is not one where a party to a trust deed
altered the terms of the trust deed before recording, unbeknownst
to the other parties. In this case, all parties to the Trust Deed,
including the Trustee, were well aware that the legal description
of the Trust Deed, at the time of its execution, was insufficient
and only covered

10 of the 12.68 acres which needed to be

encumbered. Once the description for the additional 2.68 acres had
been

created

by

Great

Basin

Engineering,

on March

6,

1993

(Transcript at 31), it was added to the legal description of the
Trust Deed prior to recording.

Such addition was known to all

three parties to the Trust Deed and therefore was not a forgery.
For that reason, Rasmussen does not stand for the proposition that
the Trust Deed in this case is void.
Plaintiff's allegation that the Trust Deed has been falsified
or forged also fails upon the examination of the circumstances
surrounding its execution.

In the construction of deeds:

The modern tendency is to disregard technicalities
and to treat all uncertainties in a conveyance as
ambiguities to be clarified by resort to the intention of
the parties as gathered from the instrument itself, the
circumstances attending and leading up to its execution,
and the subject matter and the situation of the parties
as of that time. Substance rather than form controls.
Hence, in the construction of deeds, surrounding
circumstances are accorded due weight.
In the
construction of these various factors, the court will
place itself as nearly as possible in the position of the
parties when the instrument was executed, and where the
language of a deed is ambiguous, the intention of the
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parties may be ascertained by a consideration of the
surrounding circumstances existing at the time of the
execution of the deed.
23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 221

(1983) .

An examination of the

circumstances surrounding the execution of this Trust Deed shows
clearly that the legal description comports with the order of the
court, and that the Trust Deed has not been falsified.
Plaintiff was required to deed to the Plan an additional 2.68
acres of the subject property by court order.
40) .

(Transcript at 39-

The Plan was also required by court order to pay Plaintiff

$35,972.91.

The Plan borrowed the funds necessary to make the

payment from WYCO.

As security for the obligation, the Plan

executed a Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed in favor of WYCO covering
the 12.68 acres, 10 of which had already been conveyed by White and
2.68 of which White conveyed to the Plan free and clear after the
legal description had been created. Due to the short time frame in
which to make the payment to Plaintiff referenced above, the
transaction was consummated and the Trust Deed executed prior to
the creation of the legal description for the additional 2.68
acres.

Then, when the additional description had been created,

White deeded the additional acreage to the Plan, and the Exhibit
"A" was attached to the Trust Deed prior to recording.

Thus, the

subject Trust Deed was not in any way falsified or forged but
simply corrected.
The same effect could have been accomplished through the use
of a deed of correction:
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A deed of confirmation may be appropriately utilized
in order to remove doubts as the operativeness of a prior
deed to convey title to the land intended. For example,
a mistake in the description of the land conveyed may be
corrected by a subsequent deed executed by the same
grantor for the purpose of correcting the description and
confirming in the grantee the title to the land intended
to have been described in the prior deed, and the two
deeds, taken together, will operate to pass the title to
the grantee named therein.

As between the parties a confirming or correction
deed relates back to the date of the original instrument;
23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 333-34 (1983) .

The parties to the Trust

Deed in question should not be required to jump through such
procedural hoops, when the intent of the grantor is reasonably
determinable.

Howard v. Howard. 367 P.2d 193, 195 (Utah 1962).

For that reason, the trial court should have found that the Trust
Deed

was

not

falsified

appropriate 12.68 acres.

but only

corrected

to

describe

the

Based upon the evidence in the record,

this Court should find that the Trust Deed was not falsified or
forged and overrule the trial court on this issue.
Implied in the trial court's ruling is that no consideration
was given for the Trust Deed.

However, as between the parties to

the Trust Deed, with or without consideration the Trust Deed is
valid.

Barlow Soc. v. Commercial Sec. Bank. 723 P.2d 398, 401

(Utah 1986) .

The only real issue concerning the validity of the

Trust Deed is if it worked a fraud upon creditors, specifically
Plaintiff herein. This issue is addressed elsewhere in the Brief.
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However, based on Barlow, this Court should find the Trust Deed to
be a valid and authentic document.
The final concern expressed by Judge West in the Findings of
Fact was that the Trust Deed was not recorded until the same day as
the Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure. Although recording is required to
give notice to the world concerning an interest in real property,
the fact that a document is not recorded until some time after it
is executed does not make it invalid. Huntington City v. Peterson,
518 P.2d 1246, 1247-48 (Utah 1974);

Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Bervl

Baptist Church. 642 P.2d 371, 373 (Utah 1982). Thus, the fact that
the Trust Deed was not recorded for some time does not effect its
validity or authenticity.

Indeed, the facts of this case and the

law do not support Judge West's concern over the authenticity of
the Trust Deed, and this Court should reverse the trial court and
find the Trust Deed to be a valid and enforceable document.
At

the

trial

below,

Judge

West

also

questioned

the

authenticity of the Trust Deed based on an order entered by Judge
Roth in a different action on October 27, 1988, prohibiting the
Plan from transferring or encumbering the subject property. In the
first place, as shown in the Minute Entry from Judge Roth dated
October 11, 1988, his ruling was that the parties were not to
dispose of the property.

(Addendum).

When Plaintiff's counsel

drafted the order and submitted it to Judge Roth, Defendant's
counsel failed to notice the addition by Defendant's counsel of a
prohibition on encumbrance also.
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However, the testimony is clear

that the Plan had no unencumbered assets but the 12.68 acres of
property which is the subject of this lawsuit.

Upon the court

order in the separate action that the Plan pay $35,972.91 to White,
the Plan had no choice but to encumber the subject property in
order to obtain the necessary funds to comply with the court order.
(Transcript at 41.)
In addition, Plaintiff later acquiesced to the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 1694-88 on June 15, 1989
effectively

waiving

any

objection

(Transcript at 42),

she may

have

had

to

the

encumbrance on the subject property. Therefore, the Trust Deed was
validly executed, and upon default thereon, the Plan properly
executed a Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure transferring the subject
property to WYCO.

For that reason, this Court should reverse the

trial court and grant judgment in favor of WYCO.
IV.
The Transaction Underlying the Trust Deed did not Violate
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
The final basis upon which Judge West found the Trust Deed,
and the transaction underlying it, invalid is based on the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act. The trial court gave no specific findings
concerning such violation but simply stated generally that "the
court is satisfied that the Plaintiff's analysis under Section 256-5 U.C.A. and Section 25-6-6 U.C.A. is correct." Finding No. 11.
However, an examination of the elements in the statute reveals that
the Trust Deed was not a fraudulent encumbrance.
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Two sections of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act might
apply to the facts in this action.

The first, §25-6-5, applies to

claims arising before or after an encumbrance and states:
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a
debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the
creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made
the transfer or incurred the obligation:
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or
(b)
without receiving a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for the transfer
or obligation; and the debtor:
(i) was engaged or was about
to engage in a business or a
transaction for which the remaining
assets
of
the
debtor
were
unreasonably small in relation to
the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or
believed or reasonably should have
believed that he would incur, debts
beyond his ability to pay as they
became due.
There is no dispute that Plaintiff received $35,972.91 from
the Plan (Transcript at 39, 49) and that the Plan received that
$35,972.91, together with an additional $10,000.00 for legal fees,
from WYCO in exchange for executing the subject Trust Deed in the
amount of $45,972.91.
222) .

For

that

(Transcript at 64, 71, 76, 82, 121, 125,

reason,

Subparagraph

(b) of

§25-6-5

is

not

applicable, since the Plan received a "reasonably equivalent value
in exchange for the transfer or obligation."

Thus, the Trust Deed

could be a fraudulent encumbrance under §25-6-5 only if the Trust
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Deed was executed "with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
any creditor of the debtor," pursuant to Subparagraph (a).
Paragraph (2) of §25-6-5 addresses some "badges of fraud" upon
which a court may infer actual intent under the statute. Dahnken,
Inc. of Salt Lake City v. Wilmarth. 726 P.2d 420, 423 (Utah 1986).
These badges are factors for a court to consider in a determination
of actual intent to defraud a creditor. A close examination of the
eleven badges found in §25-6-5(2) reveals that no evidence was
presented to the trial court that the Plan had any actual intent to
defraud a creditor in executing the Trust Deed dated December 20,
1988.
The first badge in subparagraph (a) is that the "obligation
was to an insider."

The trial court did not make a finding that

this factor was involved, although David Durbano did testify at
trial

concerning

his

relationship

with

WYCO

and

the

Plan.

"Insider" is defined in §25-6-2(7), which includes definitions if
the debtor, i.e., the Plan, is an individual, corporation, or
partnership. The Plan is most closely akin to a corporation. WYCO
is not an insider of the Plan, in that no evidence was submitted at
trial that WYCO is a director, officer, or person in control of the
Plan, a partnership in which the Plan is a general partner or a
general partner

in a partnership described

section, or a relative of anyone.
submitted

elsewhere

in the

In addition, no evidence was

that WYCO was an affiliate, or an

insider

of an

affiliate, as discussed in §25-6-2(7)(d) and §25-6-2(1), or a
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managing agent of the Plan, pursuant to §25-6-2(7)(e). Therefore,
no finding of actual intent to defraud can be based upon the first
badge of fraud.
The second badge is that the "debtor retained possession or
control of the property transferred after the transfer."

This

badge obviously does not apply when the action taken was to incur
an obligation as opposed to the transfer of property.

Since the

Plan did not transfer property on December 20, 1988, but only
executed a Trust Deed on that date, the second badge of fraud is
also not applicable.
The third badge is whether the "obligation was disclosed or
concealed."

Neither the Plan nor WYCO were under any duty to

disclose the Trust Deed, nor was any evidence submitted that either
party made any intentional efforts to conceal the Trust Deed. The
Trust Deed was not recorded sooner because it lacked the complete
legal description initially and then languished in the attorney's
office for a year and a half before recording, in spite of
instructions from Mr. Scott to properly handle the paperwork.
(Transcript at 74) . In the absence of any evidence of intentional
concealment, the third badge of fraud provides no basis upon which
intent to defraud can be inferred.
The fourth badge is that before the "obligation was incurred,
the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit."

While it is

true that Plaintiff had sued the Plan prior to the execution by the
Plan of the Trust Deed, the Trust Deed was only executed in order
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to raise the funds required by the court to be paid by the Plan to
Plaintiff. Thus, this badge of fraud, if applicable at all, should
not have been given much weight in the court's determination of any
alleged intent to defraud.
The fifth badge of fraud is that "the transfer was of
substantially all the debtor's assets."

Again, this badge deals

only with a transfer of assets, as opposed to incurring an
obligation.

Since the action taken by the Plan on December 20,

1988, was not a transfer of assets, this badge also is applicable.
The sixth badge is that "the debtor absconded."

Black's Law

Dictionary, Fifth Edition, defines absconding debtor as "one who
absconds (hide, conceal, or absent oneself clandestinely) from his
creditors" or "one who lives without the state, or who has
intentionally concealed himself from his creditors, or withdrawn
himself from the reach of their suits, with intent to frustrate
their just demands." The Plan was earlier sued by Plaintiff in the
action which was dismissed on June 15, 1989, and the Plan never
absconded from Plaintiff.

For that reason, the sixth badge of

fraud is also inapplicable.
The seventh badge of fraud is that "the debtor removed or
concealed assets." The Plan has neither removed or concealed any
assets.

The only action which the Plan took on December 20, 1988,

was to incur an obligation against an asset, in order to comply
with the court order, for the benefit of Plaintiff.
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For that

reason, the trial court could not infer any intent to defraud from
badge number seven.
Badge number eight is that "the value of the consideration
received by the debtor is reasonably equivalent to the value of the
asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred."

The

evidence is clear that the Plan received $35,972.91, which was paid
Plaintiff, and which, when combined with the $10,000.00 paid on the
Plan's

legal fees

(Transcript at 161), is identical to the

obligation secured by the Trust Deed executed on December 20, 1988.
Not only is the value reasonably equivalent but it is exactly
equivalent.

For

that

reason, this badge

of

fraud

is not

applicable.
The ninth badge of fraud is that "the debtor was insolvent or
became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the
obligation was incurred." The first definition of insolvency under
§25-6-3 of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is that "the sum of
the debtor's debts is greater than all of the debtor's assets."
David Durbano testified at trial that at the time of execution of
the Trust Deed, the Plan had $100,000.00 in equity on the balance
of the property which was subject to Plaintiff's lien.

(Transcript

at 283) . He also testified that the subject property was purchased
for $6,000 per acre, which at 12.68 acres would have also had some
equity over and above the $45,972.91 Trust Deed in favor of WYCO.
(Transcript at 282).

Judge West acknowledged at trial that Mr.

Durbano's testimony bore directly on the issue of intent to
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defraud.

(Transcript

at

284).

Based

upon

Mr.

Durbano's

uncontroverted testimony, the Plan's debts were not greater than
its assets.
A debtor is also presumed to be insolvent under the statute if
he is "generally not paying his debts as they become due." U.C.A.
§25-6-3(2) . The only evidence presented at trial of any failure on
the part of the Plan to pay any debt were the two defaults on the
obligation to Plaintiff.

(Transcript at 37, 42). Evidence of two

occasions of default on one obligation does not establish that the
Plan was "generally" not paying its debts, making this badge of
fraud also inapplicable.
The last two badges of fraud also deal with transfers of
assets as opposed to the incurring of an obligation. Thus, of all
the badges of fraud found in the statute, the only one which could
possibly apply to the execution of the Trust Deed by the Plan on
December 20, 1988, is the fact that the Plan had previously been
sued by Plaintiff. However, it was to Plaintiff's benefit, and to
cure the first default, that the Plan borrowed money from WYCO in
the first place. Based upon the paucity of evidence concerning any
"actual intent" of the Plan to hinder any creditor by the execution
of the Trust Deed, the trial could should have ruled that the Trust
Deed did not violate §25-6-5 of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act.
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The trial court also found that execution of the Trust Deed
violated §25-6-6 of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, which
states:
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a
debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose
before the transfer was made or the obligation was
incurred if:
(a)
the debtor made the transfer or
incurred the obligation without receiving a
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
the transfer or obligation; and
(b) the debtor was insolvent at the time
or became insolvent as a result of the
transfer or obligation.
(2) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to
a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made
if the transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent
debt, the debtor was insolvent at the time, and the
insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor
was insolvent.
Initially, it is arguable whether Plaintiff even had a claim
against the Plan prior to the date of the Trust Deed, in that
Plaintiff was not awarded a deficiency judgment until June 27,
1991.

(Transcript

at

44) .

However,

assuming

arguendo

that

Plaintiff did have a claim against the Plan prior to December 20,
1988, the trial court's finding that the Trust Deed violated §26-66 of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act was also improper.
Paragraph 1 of §25-6-6 is only satisfied if both Subparagraphs
(a) and (b) are met.

Subparagraph (a) requires that the debtor

incurred the obligation without receiving a reasonably equivalent
value in exchange for the obligation.
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It is clear in the case at

hand that the Plan received $35,972.91, which money went to
Plaintiff, in exchange for executing the Trust Deed.

Therefore,

when combined with $10,000.00 in legal fees incurred by the Plan,
the Plan received not only a reasonably equivalent value but an
exactly equivalent value. For that reason Subparagraph (a) is not
met, making Paragraph (1) if §25-6-6 inapplicable.
The second paragraph of §25-6-6 deals only with a transfer, as
opposed to the incurring of an obligation, making the second
paragraph inapplicable, because the Plan did not transfer property
but only incurred an obligation on December 20, 1988. In addition,
a transfer of assets under §25-6-6(2) must be made to an insider
for an antecedent debt. As discussed earlier, the obligation was
not incurred to an insider, nor was it made for an antecedent debt,
but for a concurrent one.

Finally, a transfer is not voidable

under §25-6-6(2) if new value is given to the debtor, which is the
case here.

U.C.A. §25-6-9(6)(a).

Thus, Plaintiff failed to

establish at trial that the Trust Deed violated §25-6-6 of the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. The trial court's finding of such
violation was an abuse of discretion and should be reversed by this
Court.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the arguments above and the record before this
court, WYCO respectfully requests that the Court reverse the trial
court's ruling and grant judgment in favor of WYCO.

In the

alternative, WYCO requests the Court to remand this matter for a
new trial.
DATED this

/ /

day of November, 1994.

DURBANO & ASSOCIATES

f

q/xz

Douglas M. Durbaho
Walter T. Merrill
Attorneys for
Defendant/Appellant

36

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

fj

day of November, 1994 a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant was
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Robert A. Echard
Robert Echard & Associates
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Key Bank Building, Suite 200
2491 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401

JX

Walter T. Merrill

(c:\wpfiles\pldgs\940023.brf)

37

ADDENDUM
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ROBERT A. FXHARD, 953
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Attorney for Plaintiff
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2'I91 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 8'l'l01
Telephone: 801-393~23'99
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

SUSAN WHITE,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE WYOMING & COLORADO RAIL,
Civil No. 910912250CV
Defendant.
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before
the Honorable Brent West on the 29th day of October, 1993.

The

Plaintiff was present in court represented by her attorney, Robert
A. Echard.

The Defendant was present in court represented by its

attorney Douglas Durbano.

The court having received evidence in

the form of testimony and exhibits and having heard arguments from
the parties

and

being

fully

informed

in

the premises, now

therefore makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
.AW OF'RCflS

1.

On or about the 13th of day of lebruary, 1985,
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David L. Durbano, as Trustee of Western Railroad Defined Benefit

Pension Plan, executed a trust deed and a trust deed note with the
Plaintiff and

her

5283,290.'10 at

then husband

10# interest

per

Melvin

T. Kemp

annum.

Said

in the sum of
trust

deed was

secured by a approximately 60 acres of property located in the
Ogden Valley, Weber Count;/, State of Utah.
2.
deed

was

On July 11, 1986, a Notice of Default on the trust

served

on Western

Pension Plan, David L.

Railroad

Builders

Defined

Benefit

Durbano, Trustee, by Susan White.

That

Notice of Default was the basis for the initiation of two (2)
separate lawsuits.

One was entitled Western Railroad Builder's

Defined Benefit Pension Plan, David L. Durbano, Trustee, Plaintiff
vs Susan H. Kemp aka Susan H. White and John Does 1 through 5
inclusive, which lawsuit was filed in the Weber County District
Court and identified as Civil No. 97872.

In that lawsuit the

Plaintiff attempted to prevent Susan White from foreclosing on the
trust deed.
The other lawsuit that was created was entitled Susan H.
Kemp aka Susan H. White, Plaintiff vs Western Railroad Builder's
Defined Benefit Pension Plan, David L. Durbano, Trustee, filed in
Weber County, identified as Civil No. 1694-88.

That lawsuit v;as

for the purpose of foreclosing on the real property.

On the 20th

day of December, 1988, in that lawsuit, Judge Roth entered an
order which prohibited Western Railroad Builder's Defined Benefit
Pension Plan from disposing of or encumbering approximately ten
N OH ICES
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(10) acres of the 60 acres which was held in its name.

Said order

remained in existence until the 15th day of June, 1993, when said
lawsuit was dismissed.
3.

The lawsuit of Western Railroad Builder's Defined

Benefit Pension Plan, David L. Durbano Trustee vs Susan H. Kemp
aka Susan H. White, was ultimately resolved by the Plaintiff
paying to the Defendant a $17,500.00 payment that was delinquent
plus $18,472.00 that was owed to an underlining obligation on the
property.

Said sums were paid to Susan II. White on the 22nd day

of December, 1989.

That lawsuit also required Susan H. White to

release to the Plaintiff 2.68 acres of additional land, which land
was conveyed to the Plaintiff on the 5th day March, 1989, making
a total acreage then possessed by the Plaintiff in the amount of
12.68 acres.
'I.

After the reinstating of the trust deed and trust

deed note, Western Railroad Builderfs Defined Benefit Pension Plan
again became delinquent in its payments and a trustee's sale was
held on the 18th day of May, 1990 at which the approximately 50
acres of land then secured under the trust deed was purchased by
Susan II. White.

Thereafter a lawsuit was filed in Weber County

by Susan H. White for a deficiency under the trust deed note.
That lawsuit was entitled

Susan White, Plaintiff vs Western

Railroad BuilderTs Defined Benefit Pension Plan, David L. Durbano,
Trustee, and identified as Civil No. 900901419. The Plaintiff in
that case was granted a judgment in the sum of $86,040.74, plus
.AW OFFICES

interest at the rate of 10 per cent from May 18, 1990 to May 8,
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a

1991, in the sum of $8,367-35 and 12 per cent interest thereafter.
Said judgment was entered on June 5, 19915.

On the 18th day of May, 1990, Douglas M. Durbano,

as the attorney for Western Railroad Builder's Defined Benefit
Pension Plan, recorded a trust deed, which was dated the 20th day
of December, 1988. The Trustor on said deed was David L. Durbano,
Trustee of Western Railroad
Plan.

Builder's Defined

Benefit

Pension

The Trustee was Douglas M. Durbano, Attorney at Law and the

beneficiary was the Wyoming and Colorado Railroad Company, Inc.
Said trust deed stated that it was issued to secure a principle
debt in the sum of $45,972.91.

The trust deed included a legal

description containing approximately 10 acres of land and a second
legal

description

containing

2.68

acres

of land.

The

legal

description of the 2.68 acres of land was not created and did not
exist until March 6, 1989 at which time it had been prepared by
Great Basin Engineering Inc. at the request of Western Railroad
Builder's Defined Benefit Pension Plan.
6,

On the same date that said trust deed was recorded,

the 18th day of May, 1990, a document entitled Deed in Lieu of
Foreclosure was also recorded, which deed was signed by David L.
Durbano as the Trustee of the Western Railroad Builder's Defined
Benefit Pension Plan and dated the 18th day of May, 1990.

Said

deed purported to transfer the 12.68 acres, which description was
attached to the trust deed, in lieu of foreclosure.
V OFFICES
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The

transfer of

the

12.68

^»cres of land

from

Western Railroad Builder's Defined Benefit Pension Plan left said
plan insolvent and without any assets.
8.
Plaintiff

After the complaint in this action was filed, the

attempted

to

obtain

documents

from

the

Defendant,

Wyoming and Colorado Railroad Company, Inc. and from David L.
Durbano by serving subpoenas, notices of depositions and by court
order.

A deposition was held on March 31, 1992 at 1:30 p.m. in

the jury room of Judge Ronald 0. Hyde, at which time Douglas M.
Durbano, David

L. Durbano and Phillip D. Scott, President of

Wyoming and Colorado Railroad were to appear and produce documents
and have their depositions taken,
that time with

No documents were produced at

the exception of some cashier's checks.

As a

result of the failure of the Defendant and the other parties to
produce documents, Judge Roth entered an order on the 12th day of
June,

1992

that

the

Defendant's

documents

were

inadmissible

because the Defendant had failed to find or produce the documents
during discovery.

Judge Roth's order read, in part, as follows:

11

. . . with the exception of cashier's check, which were presented

to the Plaintiff's counsel during the course of the deposition,
none of the documents requested by Plaintiff exist and will not
exist and will not be used as evidence . . .

as a penalty, the

Defendant

other

will

not

be

allowed

to

use

any

documentary

evidence even if discovery between now and the time of the time
of
LAW orriCLb

the

ruling.

trial."

Subsequently,

the

Court

upheld

This case was filed on May 7, 1991.

Judge

Roth's

The hearing before
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Judge Roth was on June 18, 1992.
was on August 24, 1993fair and reasonable.

a series

purportedly

of

Judge Roth's discovery guidelines were

The Defendant had ample time to find and

produce the documents/
admit

The hearing before this Court

It did not.

documents

established

at

the

the

The Defendant attempted to
time

existence

of

of

the
the

trial

transfer

encumbrance. The Court finds the documents inadmissible.
the documents, there is little or no evidence

which
or

Without

to support the

existence of a valid transfer or encumbrance of the 12.68 acres
of real property.
9.

The second issue concerns the one document that has

been available, the deed of trust.
transfer

or

encumber

the

property to the Defendant.

third

The deed of trust purports to
party's

interest

in

the

real

the court has real concerns about the

authenticity of the trust deed.
executed on December 20, 1988.

The trust deed was allegedly
However, it contained

a legal

description that didn't even exist until March 6, 1989. The trust
deed wasn't even recorded until May 18, 1990.

The trust deed is

not a credible documentation that there was a valid transfer or
encumbrance.
10.

On October 27, 1988, Judge Roth entered an order as

sent forth in paragraph 2 of these findings.

Despite being under

that order, the Western Railroad Builder's Defined Benefit Pension
Plan attempted to transfer or encumber the real property to this
/omcES
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11.

The Plaintiff has alleged in the alternative that

the transfer violates the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Section
25-6-1,

et

Seq.

provisions

U.C.A.

assumes

t,he

The

Plaintiff

existence

of

reliance
a

encumbrance of the real property involved.
the

Court's

assuming,

ruling

for

the

in

the

sake

of

above

valid

these

transfer

or

This is at odds with

paragraphs.

argument,

upon

that

However,
the

transfer

even
or

encumbrance in this case was valid, the Court is satisfied that
the transaction would be in violation of the Act and subject to
avoidance.

The Act provides that creditors may obtain avoidance

of the transfer to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's
claim.

See Section 25-6-8(1)(a) U.C.A.

Without going into great

detail or explanation, the Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff's
analysis under Section 25-6-5 U.C.A. and Section 25-6-6 U.C.A. is
correct.
12.

No award for attorney's fees is made.

The Court

can find no statute or case law that provides for an award of
attorney's fees in this type of case.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The purported transfer of 12.68 acres of land from

the Western Railroad Builder's Defined Benefit Pension Plan, David
L. Durbano Trustee, to the Wyoming and Colorado Railroad Company
Inc. , purportedly made pursuant to a trust deed and a deed in lieu
of foreclosure, both of which were recorded on May 18, 1990 is
.AW OFFICCS
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declared void and is hereby avoided, set aside and/or nullified.

Said rcaJ property is more particularly described as follows:
A part of the North half of Section 19, Township 7
North, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. Survey:
Beginning at a point in an existing fence being 60 feet
North 0°12' West along, said fence from an existing fence corner,
being 725.1 feet North'and 21.8 feet West of the Southeast corner
or the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of said Section
19, and running thence North 89° ^0' West 869-28 feet; thence North
o'l2' West 486.88 feet; thence North 87°17' East 518.23 feet to
a point on the Westerly right-of-way curve of the County Road
(said curve having a radius of 2^40.7 feet and a chord bearing
South 79°51' East); thence along said curve 87.2 feet; thence
North 89 ° 716f East 266.2 feet along an existing fence to the
corner; thence South 0°12f East 502.3 feet along the existing
fence and West line of the County Road known as Spring Creek Road
to the point of beginning.
Containing 10.00 Acres
Together with a 60-foot wide right-of-way described as
follows:
A part of-the North half of Section 19, Township 7
North, Range 1 East Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. Survey:
Beginning at an existing fence corner 725-1 feet North
and 21.8 feet West of the Southeast corner of the Southwest
Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of said Section 19; and running
thence North 89° ^0 f West 869.28 feet; thence North 0°12 ! West 60
feet; thence South 89°'*0' East 869.28 feet to the existing fence;
thence South 0°12f East 60 feet along said fence to the point of
beginning.
A part of the North Half of Section _,,
19, Township 7
North, Range 1 West, Salt lake Base and Meridian, U.S. Survey
Beginning at a point 785.10 feet North and 891.08 feet
North 89o/t0' West from the Southeast Corner-of the Southwest
Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of said Section 19, running
thence North 89°40» West 2*»3-01 feet; thence North 0°12' West
'173.95 feet; thence North 87°17t East 2*13-24 feet; thence South
0°12 ! East 486.88 feet to the point of beginning.
Contains 2.68 Acres
Together with a 60 foot wide right-of-way described as
follows:
Beginning at a point 785. 10 feet North and 21.8 feet
North 89°40f West from the Southeast Corner of the Southwest
Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of said Section 19; running
thence South 0°12f East 60.00 feet; thence North 89°40' West
1112.29 feet; thence North 0°12f West 60.00 feet; thence South
89o/40r East 1112.29 feet to the point of beginning,
/omcF_s
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Together with 3/16 of the waters or water rights to or
of Chicken Creek.
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2.

Said property remains in the name of the Western

Railroad Builder's Defined Benefit Pension Plan, David L. Durbano,
Trustee and is subject,to the indebtedness owed by said entity to
the Plaintiff, Susan ft. White, who has

the

right

to execute

against said property to satisfy her judgment pursuant to State
law.
3.

Neither party are awarded any attorney's fees.

4.

Costs shall be awarded to the Plaintiff.

DATED this

day of January, 1994.

W. BRENT WEST
District Court Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL
TO:

DEFENDANT AND ITS COUNSEL:

You will please take notice that the undersigned
attorney for Plaintiff will submit the foregoing Judgment to W.
Brent West for his signature upon the expiration of five (5) days
from the date this notice is mailed to you, allowing three (3)
days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that
time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration 1988. Kindly govern yourself accordingly.
DATED this

~?

day of January, 1994.

^

ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Plaintiff
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ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff
Key Bank Building, Suite 200
2'-I91 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 8'HlOl
Telephone: 801-393-2399
Telecopier: 801-393-23*10
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SUSAN WHITE,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs .
THE WYOMING & COLORADO RAIL,
Civil No. 910912250CV
Defendant.
The above-entitled

matter came on for hearing

before the

Honorable Brent West on the 29 th day of October, 1993-

The

Plaintiff was present in court represented by her attorney, Robert
A. Echard.

The Defendant was present in court represented by its

attorney Douglas Durbano,

The court having received evidence in

the form of testimony and exhibits and having heard arguments from
the parties

and

being

fully

informed

in

the

premises, now

therefore makes the following Judgment:
JUDGMENT
1.

The purported transfer of 12.68 acres of land from

the Western Railroad Builder's Defined Benefit Pension Plan, David
L. Durbano Trustee, to the Wyoming and Colorado Railroad Company
Inc. , purportedly made pursuant to a trust deed and a deed in lieu
,W OFFICES

of foreclosure, both of which were recorded on May 18, 1990 is
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declared void and is hereby avoided, set aside and/or nullified.
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Said real property is more particularly described as follows:
A part of the North half of Section 19, Township 7 North,
1
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. Survey:
Range
Beginning at a point in an existing fence being 60 feet
!
North 0°12 West along said fence from an existing fence corner,
being 725.1 feet North and 21.8 feet West of the Southeast corner
of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of said Section
19, and running thence North 89o/40f West 869-28 feet; thence North
o°12' West '186.88 feet; thence North 87°17' East 518.23 feet to
a point on the Westerly right-of-way curve of the County Road
(said curve having a radius of 2*10.7 feet and a chord bearing
South 79 ° 51f East); thence along said curve 87.2 feet; thence
North 8 9 ° zl 6f East 266.2 feet along an existing fence to the
corner; thence South 0°12' East 502.3 feet along the existing
fence and West line of the County Road known as Spring Creek Road
to the point of beginning.
Containing 10.00 Acres
Together with a 60-foot wide right-of-way described as
follows:
A part of the North half of Section 19, Township 7 North,
Range 1 East Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. Survey:
Beginning at*an existing fence corner 725.1 feet North and
21.8 feet West of the Southeast corner of the Southwest Quarter
of the Northeast Quarter of said Section 19; and running thence
North 89o/40f West 869.28 feet; thence North 0 o 12 ! West 60 feet;
thence South 89 ° ZI0' East 869.28 feet to the existing fence; thence
South 0°12' East 60 feet along said fence to the point of
beg inning.
A part of the North Half of Section 19, Township 7 North,
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. Survey:
Beginning at a point 785-10 feet North and 891.08 feet
North 89o/l0f West from the Southeast Corner of the Southwest
Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of said Section 19, running
thence North 89°'lO' West 2*13.01 feet; thence North 0°12 ! West
'J 73.95 feet; thence North 87°17' East 2*13.2*1 feet; thence South
0°12f East 486.88 feet to the point of beginning.
Contains 2.68 Acres
Together with a 60 foot wide right-of-way described as
follows.Beginning at a point 785.10 feet North and 21.8 feet
North 89°ii01 West from the Southeast Corner of the Southwest
Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of said Section 19; running
thence South 0°12' East 60.00 feet; thence North 89°40f West
1112.29 feet; thence North 0°12 f West 60.00 feet; thence South
89o/l0f East 1112.29 feet to the point of beginning,
Together with 3/16 of the waters or water rights to or of
Chicken Creek.
t Awomcrs
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2.

Said property remains in the name of the Western

i i

Railroad Builder's Defined Benefit Pension Plan, David L. Durbano,
Trustee and is subject to the indebtedness owed by said entity to
the Plaintiff, Susan

H. White, who has

the

right

to execute

against said property to satisfy her judgment pursuant to State
law.
3.

Neither party are awarded any attorney's fees.

l

Costs shall be awarded to the Plaintiff.

\.

DATED this

day of January, 1994.

W. BRENT WEST
District Court Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
TO:

DEFENDANT AND ITS COUNSEL:

You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for
Plaintiff will submit the foregoing Judgment to W. Brent West for
his signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date
this notice is mailed to you, allowing three (3) days for mailing,
unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to
Rule 4~50>l of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 1988.
Kindly govern yourself accordingly.
DATED this

]

day of January, 1994.
^ Q ^ t ^

ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Plaintiff
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID E. ROTH, Judge

SUSAN H. KEMP,

Case No. 1694-88

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

Date:

10/11/88

WESTERN RAILROAD BUILDERS,

James N. Jones, Reporter
Fran Lund, Court Clerk

Defendant.

This is the time set for motions.
Robert

Echard,

Esq.,

appearing

as Counsel

for t

plaintiff; plaintiff appearing in person.
Jeffrey

Noland,

Esq., appearing

on behalf

of t

defendant;
Issues presented by Counsel.
Parties are ordered not to dispose of property.
October 31, 1988 trial date is to be reserved.
Continue the case to October 12, 1988 at 9:00 am.
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FRAUD
CHAPTER 6

UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT
Section
25-6-1.
25-6-2.
25-6-3.
25-6-4.
25-6-5.
25-6-6.
25-6-7.
25-6-8.
25-6-9.
25-6-10.
25-6-11.
25-6-12.
25-6-13.

Short title.
Definitions.
Insolvency.
Value — Transfer.
Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before or after transfer.
Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before transfer.
Transfer — When made.
Remedies of creditors.
Good faith transfer.
Claim for relief — Time limits.
Legal principles applicable to chapter.
Construction of chapter.
Applicability of chapter.

25-6-1. Short title.
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act."
1988
25-6-2. Definitions.
In this chapter:
(1) "Affiliate" means:
(a) a person who directly or indirectly
owns, controls, or holds with power to vote,
20% or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who
holds the securities:
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole
discretionary power to vote the securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the power to vote;
(b) a corporation 207c or more of whose
outstanding voting securities are directly or
indirectly owned, controlled, or held with
power to vote, by the debtor or a person who
directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds,
with power to vote, 209c or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor,
other than a person who holds the securities:
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole
power to vote the securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the power to vote;
(c) a person whose business is operated by
the debtor under a lease or other agreement,
or a person substantially all of whose assets
are controlled by the debtor; or
(d) a person who operates the debtor's
business under a lease or other agreement or
controls substantially all of the debtor's assets.
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but
does not include:
(a) property to the extent it is encumbered
by a valid lien;
(b) property to the extent it is generally
exempt under nonbankruptcy law; or
(c) an interest in property held in tenancy
by the entireties to the extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim
against only one tenant.
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment,
whether or not the right is reduced to judgment,
J^uidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, malUr
ed, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
C i t a b l e , secured, or unsecured.

25-6-2
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim.
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim.
(6) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a
claim.
(7) "Insider" includes:
(a) if the debtor is an individual:
(i) a relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;
(ii) a partnership in which the debtor
is a general partner;
(iii) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (7)(a)(ii);
(iv) a corporation of which the debtor
is a director, officer, or person in control;
or
(v) a limited liability company of
which the debtor is a member or manager;
(b) if the debtor is a corporation:
(i) a director of the debtor;
(ii) an officer of the debtor;
(iii) a person in control of the debtor;
(iv) a partnership in which the debtor
is a general partner.
(v) a general partner in a partnership
described in Subsection (7)(b)(iv);
(vi) a limited liability company of
which the debtor is a member or manager; or
(vii) a relative of a general partner,
director, officer, or person in control of
the debtor;
(c) if the debtor is a partnership:
(i) a general partner in the debtor;
(ii) a relative of a general partner in,
a general partner of, or a person in control of the debtor;
(iii) another partnership in which the
debtor is a general partner;
(iv) a general partner in a partnership" described in Subsection (7)(c)(iii);
(v) a limited liability company of
which the debtor is a member or manager; or
(vi) a person in control of the debtor;
(d) if the debtor is a limited liability company:
(i) a member or manager of the
debtor;
(ii) another limited liability company
in which the debtor is a member or manager;
(iii) a partnership in which the debtor
is a general partner;
(iv) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (7)(d)(iii);
(v) a person in control of the debtor; or
(vi) a relative of a general partner,
member, manager, or person in control
of the debtor;
(ej an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate
as if the affiliate were the debtor; and
(f) a managing agent of the debtor.
(8) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in property to secure payment of a debt or
performance of an obligation, and includes a security interest created by agreement, a judicial
hen obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings, a common-law hen. or a statutory lien.
(9) "Person" means an individual, partnership,
limited liability company, corporation, association, organization, government or governmental

25-6-3
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subdivision or agency, business trust, estate,
trust, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(10) "Property" means anything that may be
i l D " R e l a u . e means an individual or aft individual related to a spouse, related by consanguinity within the third degree as determined by
the common law, or a spouse, and includes an
individual in an adoptive relationship withift the
third degree.
(12) "Transfer" mean's every mode, direct or
indirect, absolute or conditional, or voluntary or
involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an
asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a
hen or other encumbrance.
(13) "Valid hen" means a lien that is effective
against the holder of a judicial lien subsequently
obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings.
1992
25-6-3. I n s o l v e n c y .
( D A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's
debts is gTeater than all of the debtor's assets at a fair
valuation.
(2) A debtor who is generally not paying his debts
as they become due is presumed to be insolvent.
(3) A partnership is insolvent under Subsection (1)
if the sum of the partnership's debts is greater than
the aggregate, at a fair variation, of aYi of the partnership's assets and the sum of the excess of the value
of each general partner's nonpartnership assets over
the partner's nonpartnership debts.
(4) Assets under this section do not include property that has been transferred, concealed, or removed
with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or
that has been transferred in a manner making the
transfer voidable under this chapter.
(5) Debts under this section do not include an obligation to the extent it is secured by a valid lien on
property of the debtor not included as an asset.
1988
25-6-4. V a l u e — T r a n s f e r .
(D Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if,
in exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is
transferred or an antecedent debt is secured or satisfied. However, value does not include an unperformed
promise made other than in the ordinary course of the
promisor's business to furnish support to the debtor
or another person.
(2) Under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b) and Section
25-6-6. a person gives a reasonably equivalent value
if the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an
asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive
foreclosure sale or execution of a power of sale for the
acquisition or disposition of the interest of the de~btor
upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement.
(3) A transfer is made for present value if the exchange between the debtor and the transferee is intended by them to be contemporaneous and is in fact
substantially contemporaneous.
1988
25-6-5.

F r a u d u l e n t t r a n s f e r — Claim a r i s i n g before o r after t r a n s f e r ,
( D A transfer made or obligation incurred by a
debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the
creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor
made the transfer or incurred the obligation:
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or

(b) without receiving a reasonably eon
value in exchange for the transfer or obli " i S ^
gatl
and the debtor*:
(n was en^a&ed or was about <#> %Tlg
.
a business or a transaction for which tV» 3 ?
maining assets of the debtor were unre " ^
ably small in relation to the business*^
transaction: or
"or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or n*^
sonably should have believed that he wouW
incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as th
became due.
^
12) To determine "actual intent" under Subsection
<D(a), consideration may be given, among other faS
tors, to whether:
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of
the property transferred after the transfer \-»
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or
concealed;
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation
was incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit;
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the
debtor's assets;
(0 the debtor absconded;
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(h) the value of the consideration received by
the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the
value of the asset transferred or the amount of
the obligation incurred;
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the
obligation was incurred;
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or
shortly after a substantial debt was incurred; and
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets
of the business to a lienor who transferred the
assets to an insider of the debtor.
1988
25-6-6.

F r a u d u l e n t t r a n s f e r — Claim arising before t r a n s f e r .
( D A transfer made or obligation incurred by a
debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim
arose before the transfer was made or the obligation
was incurred if:
(a) the debtor made the transfer or incurred
the obligation without receiving a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or
obligation; and
(b) the debtor was insolvent at the time or became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.
(2) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to
2i tTfe&ltOT ^Ylt)S>fe tY&Ym ?t?OS>£ WtOYfe tYlfc VT*W?&feT

w a S

made if the transfer was made to an insider for an
antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at the time,
and the insider had reasonable cause to believe that
19
the debtor was insolvent.
^
25-6-7. T r a n s f e r — W h e n m a d e .
In this chapter:
( D A transfer is made:
(a) with respect to an asset that is real
property other t h a n a fixture, but including
the interest of a seller or purchaser under a
contract for the sale of the asset, when the
transfer is so far perfected that a g°°^" f f[J^
purchaser of the asset from the d e b t T
against whom applicable law permits
transfer to be perfected cannot acquire a
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interest in the asset that is superior to the
interest of the transferee; and
(b) with respect to an asset that is not real
property or that is a fixture, when the transfer is so far perfected that a creditor on a
simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien
other than under this chapter that is superior to the interest of the transferee.
(2) If applicable law permits the transfer to be
perfected as provided in Subsection (1) and the
transfer is not so perfected before the commencement of an action for relief under this chapter,
the transfer is deemed made immediately before
the commencement of the action.
(3) If applicable law does not permit the transfer to be perfected as provided in Subsection (1),
the transfer is made when it becomes effective
between the debtor and the transferee.
(4) A transfer is not made until the debtor has
acquired rights in the asset transferred.
(5) An obligation is incurred:
(a) if oral, when it becomes effective between the parties; or
(b) if evidenced by a writing, w h e n t h e
w r i t i n g executed by t h e obligor is delivered
to or for t h e benefit of t h e obligee.
1988
25-6-8. Remedies of creditors.
(1) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this chapter, a creditor, subject to the
limitations in Section 25-6-9, may obtain:
(a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to
the extent necessary to satisfy the creditors
claim;
(b) an attachment or other provisional remedy
against the asset transferred or other property of
the transferee in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(c) subject to applicable principles of equity
and in accordance with applicable rules of civil
procedure:
(i) an injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a transferee, or both, of
the asset transferred or of other property;
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take
charge of the asset transferred or of other
property of the transferee; or
(iii) any other relief the circumstances
may require.
(2) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim
against the debtor, the creditor, if the court orders,
may levy execution on the asset transferred or its
proceeds.
1988
25-6-9. Good faith transfer.
( D A transfer or obligation is not voidable under
Subsection 25-6-5tl'ia) against a person who took in
good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value or
against any subsequent transferee or obligee.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to
the extent a transfer is voidable in an action by a
creditor under Subsection 25-6-8(1 ha), the creditor
may recover judgment for the value of the asset
transferred, as adjusted under Subsection (3), or the
amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim,
whichever is less. The judgment may be entered
against:
(a) the first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the transfer was made; or
(b) any subsequent transferee other than a
good faith transferee who took for value or from
any subsequent transferee.
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(3) If the judgment under Subsection (2) is based
upon the value of the asset transferred, the judgment
must be for an amount equal to the value of the asset
at the time of the transfer, subject to an adjustment
as equities may require.
(4) Notwithstanding.voidability of a transfer or an
obligation under this chapter, a good-faith transferee
or obligee is entitled, to the extent of the value given
the debtor for the transfer or obligation, to:
(a) a Hen on or a right to retain any interest in
the asset transferred;
(b) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or
(c) a reduction in the amount of the liability on
the judgment.
(5) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection
25-6-5(1 )(b) or Section 25-6-6 if the transfer results
from:
(a) termination of a lease upon default by the
debtor when the termination is pursuant to the
lease and applicable law; or
(b) enforcement of a security interest in compliance with Tide 70A, Chapter 9, the Uniform
Commercial Code.
(6) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection
25-6-6(2):
(a) to the extent the insider gave new value to
or for the benefit of the debtor after the transfer
was made unless the new value was secured by a
valid lien;
(b) if made in the ordinary course of business
or financial affairs of the debtor and the insider;
or
(c) if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to
rehabilitate the debtor and the transfer secured
present value given for that purpose as well as an
antecedent debt of the debtor.
1988
25-6-10. Claim for relief — Time limits.
A claim for relief or cause of action regarding a
fraudulent transfer or obligation under this chapter
is extinguished "unless action is brought:
(1) under Subsection 25-6-5(1 Ka), within four
years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one year
after the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant;
(2) under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b) or 25-6-6(1),
within four years after the transfer was made or
the obligation was incurred; or
(3) under Subsection 25-6-6(2), within one
year after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred.
1988
25-6-11. Legal principles applicable to chapter.
Unless displaced by this chapter, the principles of
law and equity, including merchant law and the law
relating to principal and agent, equitable subordination, estoppel, laches, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, insolvency, or other validating or invalidating cause, supplement this chapter's
provisions.
1988
25-6-12. Construction of chapter.
This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law
with respect to the subject of this chapter among
states enacting it.
1988
25-6-13. Applicability of chapter.
This act applies when any transfer occurs after the
effective date of this act.
1988

